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representing and reasoning about information change, little is known about the computational
complexity of its associated decision problems. In fact, we only know that for public announcement
logic, a fragment of DEL, the satisfiability problem and the model-checking problem are respectively
PSPACE-complete and in P. We contribute to fill this gap by proving that for the DEL language
with event models, the model-checking problem is, surprisingly, PSPACE-complete. Also, we
prove that the satisfiability problem is NEXPTIME-complete. In doing so, we provide a sound
and complete tableau method deciding the satisfiability problem.
Key-words: Dynamic epistemic logic, computational complexity, model checking, satisfiability
This Technical Report is an extended version with full proofs of the article published with the same name
in the proceedings of the conference Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2013), Chennai,
India, January 2013
∗ Université de Rennes 1 - INRIA, France
† ENS Cachan, France
On the Complexity of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (Extended
Version)
Résumé : Bien que la logique épistemique dynamique (DEL) soit un formalisme logique influ-
ant qui permet de représenter et de raisonner sur le changement d’information, nous connaissons
assez peu des propriétés computationnelles de ses problèmes de décision associés. En fait, nous
savons seulement que pour la logique des annonces publiques, qui est un fragment de DEL,
le problème de satisfiabilité et le problème du model checking sont respectivement PSPACE-
complet et dans P. Nous contribuons à combler cette lacune en prouvant que pour le langage
de DEL avec modèles d’événements, le problème du model-checking est étonnamment PSPACE-
complet. Par ailleurs, nous prouvons que le problème de satisfiabilité est NEXPTIME-complet.
Ce faisant, nous introduisons une méthode tableau correcte et complête qui décide le problème
de satisfiabilité.
Mots-clés : Logique épistémique dynamique, méthode tableau, complexité calculatoire
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1 Introduction
Research fields like distributed artificial intelligence, distributed computing and game theory all
deal with groups of human or non-human agents which interact, exchange and receive infor-
mation. The problems they address range from multi-agent planning and design of distributed
protocols to strategic decision making in groups. In order to address appropriately and rigorously
these problems, it is necessary to be able to provide formal means for representing and reasoning
about such interactions and flows of information. The framework of Dynamic Epistemic Logic
(DEL for short) is very well suited to this aim. Indeed, it is a logical framework where one can
represent and reason about beliefs and knowledge change of multiple agents, and more generally
about information change.
The theoretical work of the above mentioned research fields has already been applied to
various practical problems stemming from telecommunication networks, World Wide Web, peer
to peer networks, aircraft control systems, and so on. . . In general, in all applied contexts, the
investigation of the algorithmic aspects of the formalisms employed plays an important role in
determining whether and to what extent they can be applied. For this reason, the algorithmic
aspects of DEL need to be studied.
To this aim, a preliminary step consists in studying the computational properties of its main
associated decision problems, namely the model checking problem and the satisfiability problem.
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Indeed, it will indirectly provide algorithmic methods to solve these decision problems and give
us a hint of whether and to what extent our methods can be applied. However, surprisingly little
is known about the computational complexity of these problems. We only know that for public
announcement logic, a fragment of DEL [Plaza, 1989], the model checking problem is in P and
the satisfiability problem is PSPACE-complete. Here, we aim to fill this gap for the full language
of DEL with event models.
DEL is built on top of epistemic logic. An epistemic model represents how a given set
of agents perceive the actual world in terms of beliefs and knowledge about this world and
about the other agents’ beliefs. The insight of the DEL approach is that one can describe how
an event is perceived by agents in a very similar way: an agent’s perception of an event can
also be described in terms of beliefs and knowledge. For example, at the battle of Waterloo,
when marshal Blücher received the message of the duke of Wellington inviting him to join the
attack at dawn against Napoleon, Wellington did not know at that very moment that Blücher
was receiving his message, and Blücher knew it. This is a typical example of announcement
which is not public. This led Baltag, Moss and Solecki to introduce the notion of event model
[Baltag et al., 1998]. The definition of an event model, denoted (M′, w′), is very similar to the
definition of an epistemic model. They also introduced a product update, which defines a new
epistemic model representing the situation after the event. Then, they extended the epistemic
language with dynamic operators [M′, w′]ϕ standing for ‘ϕ holds after the occurrence of the
event represented by (M′, w′)’.
Using the so-called reduction axioms, it turns out that any formula with dynamic operator(s)
can be translated to an equivalent epistemic formula without dynamic operator. As a first
approximation, we could be tempted to use these reduction axioms to reduce both the model
checking problem and the satisfiability problem of DEL to the model checking problem and the
satisfiability problem of epistemic logic, because optimal algorithmic methods already exist for
these related problems. However, the reduction algorithm induced by the reduction axioms is
exponential in the size of the input formula. Therefore, for the satisfiability problem, we only
obtain an algorithm which is in EXPSPACE (because the satisfiability problem of epistemic logic
is PSPACE-complete), and for the model checking problem, we only obtain an algorithm which is
in EXPTIME (because the model checking problem of epistemic logic is in P). These algorithms
are not optimal because, as we shall see, there exists an algorithm solving the satisfiability
problem which is in NEXPTIME⊆ EXPSPACE and also an algorithm solving the model checking
problem which is in PSPACE⊆ EXPTIME. Our algorithm for solving the satisfiability problem
is based on a sound and complete tableau method which does not resort to the reduction axioms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the core of the DEL framework and
the different variants of languages with event models which have been introduced in the literature.
In Section 3, we prove that the model checking problem of DEL is PSPACE-complete, and in
Section 4 we prove that the satisfiability problem is NEXPTIME-complete. In Section 5, we
discuss related works and whether our results still hold when we extend the expressivity of the
language with common belief and ‘star’ iteration operators. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Following the methodology of DEL, we split the exposition of the DEL logical framework into
three subsections. In Section 2.1, we recall the syntax and semantics of the epistemic language.
In Section 2.2, we define event models, and in Section 2.3, we define the product update. In
Section 2.4, we recall the different languages that have been introduced in the DEL literature
and we introduce our language LDEL.
RR n° 8164
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2.1 Epistemic language
In the rest of the paper, ATM is a countable set of atomic propositions and AGT is a finite set
of agents.
A (pointed) epistemic model (M, w) represents how the actual world represented by w is
perceived by the agents. Intuitively, in this definition, vRau means that in world v agent a
considers that world u might be the actual world.
Definition 1 (Epistemic model). An epistemic model is a tuple M = (W,R, V ) where W is a
non-empty set of possible worlds, R maps each agent a ∈ AGT to a relation Ra ⊆ W ×W and
V : ATM → 2W is a function called a valuation. We abusively write w ∈ M for w ∈ W and we
say that (M, w) is a pointed epistemic model. We also write v ∈ Ra(w) for wRav.
Then, we define the following epistemic language LEL. It can be used to describe and state
properties of epistemic models:
Definition 2 (Epistemic language). The language LEL of epistemic logic is defined as follows:
LEL : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Baϕ
where p ranges over ATM and a ranges over AGT. A formula of LEL is called an epistemic
formula. The formula ⊥ is an abbreviation for p ∧ ¬p, and ⊤ is an abbreviation for ¬⊥. The
formula 〈Ba〉ϕ is an abbreviation of ¬Ba¬ϕ. The size of a formula ϕ ∈ LEL is defined by
induction as follows: |p| = 1; |¬ϕ| = 1 + |ϕ|; |ϕ ∧ ψ| = 1 + |ϕ|+ |ψ|; |Baϕ| = 1 + |ϕ|.
Intuitively, the formula Baϕ reads as ‘agent a believes that ϕ holds in the current situation’.
Definition 3 (Truth conditions). Given an epistemic model M = (W,R, V ) and a formula
ϕ ∈ LEL, we define inductively the satisfaction relation |=⊆W ×LEL as follows: for all w ∈W ,
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ψ
M, w |= ¬ϕ iff not M, w |= ϕ
M, w |= Baϕ iff for all v ∈ Ra(w), we have M, v |= ϕ
We write M |= ϕ when for all w ∈M, it holds that M, w |= ϕ. Also, we write |= ϕ, and we say
that ϕ is valid, when for all epistemic model M, it holds that M |= ϕ. Dually, we say that ϕ is
satisfiable when ¬ϕ is not valid.
Example 1. Our running example is inspired by the coordinated attack problem from the
distributed systems folklore [Fagin et al., 1995]. Our set of atomic propositions is ATM = {p}
and our set of agents is AGT = {1, 2}. Agent 1 is the duke of Wellington and agent 2 is marshal
Blücher; p stands for ‘Wellington wants to attack at dawn’. The initial situation is represented
in Figure 1 by the pointed epistemic model (M, w) = ({w, u}, R1 = {(w,w), (u, u)}, R2 =
{(w,w), (w, u)}, V (p) = {w}). In this pointed epistemic model, it holds that M, w |= p ∧ B1p:
Wellington ‘knows’ that he wants to attack at dawn. It also holds that M, w |= ¬B2p: Blücher
does not ‘know’ that Wellington wants to attack at dawn; and M, w |= B1¬B2p: Wellington
‘knows’ that Blücher does not ‘know’ that he wants to attack at dawn.
2.2 Event model
A (pointed) event model (M′, w′) represents how the actual event represented by w′ is perceived
by the agents. Intuitively, in this definition, u′R′av
′ means that while the possible event repre-
sented by u′ is occurring, agent a considers possible that the event represented by v′ is in fact
occurring.
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Figure 1: Pointed epistemic models (M, w) (left), ((M⊗M′1), (w,w
′
1)) (center) and (M⊗M
′
1⊗
M′2, (w,w
′
1, w
′
2)) (right)
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Figure 2: Pointed event models (M′1, w
′
1) (left) and (M
′
2, w
′
2) (right)
Definition 4 (Event model). An event model is a tupleM′ = (W ′, R′, P re) where W ′ is a non-
empty and finite set of possible events, R′ maps each agent a ∈ AGT to a relation R′a ⊆W
′×W ′
and Pre : W ′ → LEL is a function that maps each event to a precondition expressed in the
epistemic language.
We abusively write w′ ∈ M′ for w′ ∈ W ′ and we say that (M′, w′) is a pointed event
model. The size of an event model M′ = (W ′, R′, P re) is noted |M′| and is defined as follows:
card(W ′) +
∑
a∈AGT card(R
′
a) +
∑
w′∈W ′ |Pre(w
′)|.
Example 2. In Figure 2 are represented two pointed event models. The first, (M1, w
′
1) =
({w′1, u
′
1}, R1 = {(w
′
1, u
′
1), (u
′
1, u
′
1)}, R2 = {(w
′
1, w
′
1), (u
′
1, u
′
1)}, P re, w
′
1) where Pre(w
′
1) = p and
Pre(u′1) = ⊤, represents the event whereby Blücher receives the message of Wellington that
he wants to attack at dawn. When this happens, Wellington believes that nothing happens
and believes that this is even common knowledge. The second, (M2, w
′
2) = ({w
′
2, u
′
2}, R1 =
{(w′2, w
′
2), (u
′
2, u
′
2)}, R2 = {(w
′
2, u
′
2), (u
′
2, u
′
2)}, P re, w
′
2), where Pre(w
′
2) = B2p and Pre(u
′
2) = ⊤,
represents the event whereby Wellington receives the message of Blücher telling him that he
‘knows’ that Wellington wants to attack at dawn.
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2.3 Product update
The following product update yields a new pointed epistemic modelM⊗M′, (w,w′) representing
how the new situation which was previously represented by (M, w) is perceived by the agents
after the occurrence of the event represented by (M′, w′).
Definition 5 (Product update). Let M = (W,R, V ) be an epistemic model and let M′ =
(W ′, R′, P re) be an event model. The product update of M by M′ is the epistemic model
M⊗M′ = (W ′′, R′′, V ′′) defined as follows (p and a range over ATM and AGT respectively):
W ′′ ={(w,w′) ∈W ×W ′ | M, w |= Pre(u′)}
R′′a ={〈(w,w
′), (v, v′)〉 ∈W ′′ ×W ′′ | wRav and w
′R′av
′}
V ′′(p) ={(w,w′) ∈W ′′ | w ∈ V (p)}
Given a pointed epistemic model (M, w), and a pointed event model (M′, w′), we say that
(M′, w′) is executable in (M, w) when M, w |= Pre(w′). If M is an epistemic model and
M′1, . . . ,M
′
n are event models, we abusively write M⊗M
′
1 ⊗ · · · ⊗M
′
n for (. . . ((M⊗M
′
1) ⊗
M′2)⊗ . . .)⊗M
′
n and (w,w
′
1, . . . , w
′
n) for (. . . ((w,w
′
1), w
′
2), . . .), w
′
n).
Example 3. The pointed epistemic models ((M⊗M′1), (w,w
′
1)) and (M⊗M
′
1⊗M
′
2, (w,w
′
1, w
′
2))
are represented in Figure 1. After Blücher receives the message of Wellington, Blücher ‘knows’
that Wellington wants to attack at dawn, but Wellington does not ‘know’ that Blücher ‘knows’ it:
M⊗M′1, (w,w
′
1) |= p∧B2p∧¬B1B2p. Likewise, after Wellington receives the message of Blücher
telling him that he ‘knows’ that he wants to attack at dawn (B2p), Wellington ‘knows’ that
Blücher ‘knows’ that he wants to attack at dawn, but Blücher does not ‘know’ that Wellington
‘knows’ it: M⊗M′1 ⊗M
′
2, (w,w
′
1, w
′
2) |= p ∧ B2p ∧ B1B2p ∧ ¬B2B1B2p. Hence, in particular,
M, w |= ¬[M′1, w
′
1][M
′
2, w
′
2]B2B1B2p.
2.4 Languages of DEL
In [Baltag et al., 1998], the language is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Baϕ | [M
′, w′]ϕ
where p ranges over ATM , a ranges over AGT and (M′, w′) is any pointed and finite event
model. The formula 〈M′, w′〉ϕ is an abbreviation for ¬[M′, w′]¬ϕ.
Intuitively, [M′, w′]ϕ reads as ‘ϕ will hold after the occurrence of the event represented by
(M′, w′)’ and 〈M′, w′〉ϕ reads as ‘the event represented by (M′, w′) is executable in the current
situation and ϕ will hold after its execution’.
However, note that in this definition, preconditions of event models are necessarily epistemic
formulas. In [Baltag and Moss, 2004], another language is introduced which can deal with event
models whose preconditions may involve formulas with event models. This language relies on the
notion of event signature and the epistemic language is extended with a modality [Σ, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn]ϕ,
where Σ is an event signature. The language of [Baltag and Moss, 2004] also includes PDL-like
program constructions such as sequential composition, union and ‘star’ operation of event models
(see Section 5 for a definition of these program constructions).
In [van Ditmarsch et al., 2007], preconditions can also be formulas involving event mod-
els, but only union of programs is allowed. It is therefore a fragment of the language of
[Baltag and Moss, 2004] since it does not include sequential composition nor the ‘star’ opera-
tion. This will be our language in this paper.
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Definition 6 ([van Ditmarsch et al., 2007]). The language LDEL is the union of the formulas
ϕ ∈ Lstat⊗ and the events (or epistemic events) π ∈ L
dyn
⊗ defined by the following rule:
Lstat⊗ : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Baϕ | [π]ϕ
Ldyn⊗ : π ::=M
′, w′ | (π ∪ π)
where p ranges over ATM , a ranges over AGT and (M′, w′) is a pointed and finite event model
such that for all w′ ∈ M′, Pre(w′) is a formula of Lstat⊗ that has already been constructed in a
previous stage of the inductively defined hierarchy.
The size of ϕ ∈ LDEL is defined as for the epistemic language together with the induction
case |[π]ϕ| = 1 + |π|+ |ϕ| where |M′, w′| = |M′|, and |π ∪ γ| = 1 + |π|+ |γ|.
Definition 7 (Truth conditions). Given an epistemic model M = (W,R, V ) and a formula
ϕ ∈ LDEL, we define inductively the satisfaction relation |=⊆W × LDEL as follows:
M, w |= [M′, w′]ϕ iff M, w |= Pre(w′) implies M⊗M′, (w,w′) |= ϕ
M, w |= [π ∪ γ]ϕ iff M, w |= [π]ϕ and M, w |= [γ]ϕ.
The other induction steps are identical to the induction steps of Definition 3.
The results in this paper are the same whether or not the formulas of the preconditions involve
event models. However, the result of NEXPTIME-completeness of the satisfiability problem of
Section 4 holds only if we consider union of event models as a program construction in the
language.
3 Model checking problem
The model checking problem of LDEL is defined as follows:
Input: a pointed epistemic model (M, w) and a formula ϕ ∈ LDEL;
Output: yes iff M, w |= ϕ.
Whereas the model checking problem with an epistemic formula of LEL is in P, model check-
ing with a formula of LDEL is surprisingly PSPACE-complete. This shows that the addition of
dynamic modalities with event models to LEL increases tremendously the computational com-
plexity of the model checking problem.
3.1 Upper bound
In Figure 3 is defined a deterministic algorithm M-Check( w M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i , ϕ) that checks
whether we have M⊗M′1 ⊗ . . .M
′
i, (w,w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= ϕ, where (M, w) is a pointed epistemic
model and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, (M′j , w
′
j) is a pointed event model. The precondition of a call
to the function M-Check(. . . ) is that (w,w′1, . . . , w
′
i) ∈ M⊗M
′
1 ⊗ . . .M
′
i, that is, the sequence
(M′1, w
′
1) . . . , (M
′
i, w
′
i) is executable in (M, w). In order to check whether M, w |= ϕ, we just
call M-Check(w,ϕ).
Theorem 1. The model checking problem of LDEL is in PSPACE.
RR n° 8164
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Proof. Terminaison and correction of the algorithm M-Check are easily proved over the size of
the input defined by:
|M|+
i∑
k=1
|M′k|+ |ϕ|.
The only case worth mentionning is when ϕ is of the form [M′, w′]ψ. In that case, the number
of recursive calls of M-Check(w M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i;M
′, w′ ψ) is of size |M| +
i∑
k=1
|M′k| +
|M′| + |ψ|. This quantity is indeed smaller than the size of the call of ϕ, because it is equal to
|M|+
i∑
k=1
|M′k|+ |ϕ| = |M|+
i∑
k=1
|M′k|+ |M
′|+ |ψ|+ 1.
The algorithm requires a polynomial amount of space in the size of the input. Indeed, as
the size of the input is strictly decreasing at each recursive call, the number of recursive calls
in the call stack is linear in the size of the input. Then each of the current call requires a
polynomial amount of space in the size of the input for storing the value of local variables: the
most consuming case is Baψ where we have to save all the current values of u, u1, . . . , ui in the
loop for.
3.2 Lower bound
We prove that the algorithm of the previous section is optimal. To do so, we provide a polynomial
reduction of the quantified Boolean formula satisfiability problem, known to be PSPACE-complete
[Papadimitriou, 1995, p. 455] to the model-checking problem of LDEL.
Theorem 2. The model checking problem of LDEL is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we only consider in this proof quantified Boolean formulas
of the form ∀p1∃p2∀p3 . . . ∀p2k−1∃p2kψ(p1, . . . p2k), where ψ(p1, . . . , p2k) is a Boolean formula
over the atomic propositions p1, . . . , p2k. The formula ∀p1∃p2∀p3 . . . ∀p2k−1∃p2kψ(p1, . . . p2k) is
satisfiable iff for both truth values of the atomic proposition p1 there is a truth value for the
atomic proposition p2 such that for both truth values of the atomic proposition p3, and so on up
to p2k, the formula ψ(p1, . . . p2k) is true in the overall truth assignment.
We can restrict ourselves to LDEL where there is only one agent a. The quantified Boolean
formula satisfiability problem is defined as follows:
Input: a natural number k and a quantified Boolean formula ϕ ,
∀p1∃p2∀p3 . . . ∀p2k−1∃p2kψ(p1, . . . , p2k);
Output: yes iff ϕ is satisfiable.
Let ϕ = ∀p1∃p2∀p3 . . . ∀p2k−1∃p2kψ(p1, . . . p2k) be a quantified Boolean formula. We define a
pointed epistemic model (M, w0), 2k pointed event models (M′1, w
′0
1 ), . . . , (M
′
2k, w
′0
2k), a pointed
event model M′, w
′0
 and an epistemic formula ψ
′ that are computable in polynomial time in
the size of ϕ such that:
ϕ is satisfiable in quantified Boolean logic
iff
M, w0 |= [M′1, w
′0
1 ∪M
′
, w
′0
]〈M
′
2, w
′0
2 ∪M
′
, w
′0
〉 . . .
[M′2k−1, w
′0
2k−1 ∪M
′
, w
′0
]〈M
′
2k, w
′0
2k ∪M
′
, w
′0
〉ψ
′.
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function M-Check(w M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ϕ)
match (ϕ)
case p:
return w ∈ V (p);
case ¬ψ:
return not M-Check(w M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ψ);
case ψ1 ∧ ψ2:
return (M-Check(w M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ψ1) and
M-Check(w M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ψ2));
case Baψ:
for u ∈ Ra(w)
for u′1 ∈ R
′
a(w
′
1)
if M-Check(u, Pre(u′1))
...
for u′i ∈ R
′
a(w
′
i)
if M-Check(u M′1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i−1, u
′
i−1 Pre(u
′
i))
if not M-Check(u M′1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i ψ);
return false ;
endIf
endIf endFor . . . endIf endFor endFor
return true ;
case [M′, w′]ψ:
if M-Check(w M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i Pre(w
′))
return M-Check(w M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i;M
′, w′ ψ);
endIf
return true ;
case [π ∪ γ]ψ:
return (M-Check(w M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i [π]ψ) and
M-Check(w M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i [γ]ψ));
endMatch
endFunction
Figure 3: PSPACE algorithm for model checking
The corresponding instance of the model checking problem of LDEL is computable in polynomial
time in the size of ϕ. Now, let us describe M, w0, the event models M
′
1, w
′0
1 , . . . ,M
′
2k, w
′0
2k, the
event model M′, w
′0
 and ψ
′.
• M = (W,R, V ) is defined by:
– W = {w0, w1, . . . , w2k+1};
– Ra = {(w
j , wj+1 | j ∈ {0, . . . , 2k}};
– and V (p) = ∅ for all p ∈ ATM
• For all i ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}, M′i = (W
′
i , R
′
i, P rei) is defined by:
– W ′i = {w
′0
i , w
′1
i , . . . , w
′i
i , w
′
i }
– Ri
′
a = {(w
′j
i , w
′j+1
i ) | j ∈ {0, . . . , i− 1}} ∪ {(w
′0
i , w
′
i ), (w
′
i , w
′
i )}
– and Prei(u
′) = ⊤ for all u′ ∈W ′i
• M′, w
′0
 = (W
′
, R
′
, P re) is defined by:
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– W ′ = {w
′0
}
– R
′
a = {(w
′0
, w
′0
)}
– Pre(w
′0
) = ⊤
• ψ′ = ψ(p1 ← 〈Ba〉Ba⊥, . . . , p2k ← (〈Ba〉)
2kBa⊥), that is, ψ
′ is the formula ψ where all pi
occurrences are substituted by (〈Ba〉)
iBa⊥. (The formula 〈Ba〉
iϕ is an abbreviation for
〈Ba〉 . . . 〈Ba〉ϕ with i operators 〈Ba〉.)
The semantics is simulated in the following way. The proposition pi is interpreted as the
presence of a chain of length exactly i from the root of a given epistemic model. That is why
in ψ′, the proposition pi is substituted by (〈Ba〉)
iBa⊥, which is true in the root of the final
epistemic model iff there exists a chain of length i in that model.
Note that updating an epistemic model where there is a chain of length 2k + 1 by M′i, w
′0
i
where i ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}:
• preserves the presence or absence of any chain of length j 6= i; in particular, it always
preserves the presence of the chain of length 2k + 1;
• adds a chain of length i, that is pi becomes true;
Note also that updating an epistemic model where there is a chain of length 2k+1 byM′, w
′0

preserves the presence or absence of any chain. So, it will keep pi false if it was already false and
it will keep any pi true if it was already true. In other words, the M
′
, w
′0
 is a neutral element
for the product update.
The crucial invariant property (Inv) of an epistemic model is the existence of a chain of
length 2k + 1 in any update of M, w0 by any sequence of M′, w
′0
 and M
′
i, w
′0
i .
The behavior of ∀pi in quantified Boolean logic consists in a universal choice of a truth value
for pi. It is translated by the update operator [M
′
i, w
′0
i ∪M
′
, w
′0
] whose semantics is to choose
universally the update of the epistemic model byM′i, w
′0
i , that will give a new updated epistemic
model with a chain of length i, that is pi is true, or by M
′
, w
′0
 that will let the new updated
epistemic model without a chain of length i, that is pi is false.
The behavior of ∃pi in quantified Boolean logic consists in an existential choice of a truth
value for pi. It is translated by the update operator 〈M
′
i, w
′0
i ∪M
′
, w
′0
〉 whose semantics is to
choose existentially the update of the epistemic model by M′i, w
′0
i , that will give a new updated
epistemic model with a chain of length i, that is pi is true, or by M
′
, w
′0
, that will let the new
updated epistemic model without a chain of length i, that is pi is false.
Remark. Note that the reduction used to prove that the model checking problem of LDEL is
PSPACE-hard uses only the precondition ⊤.
4 Satisfiability problem
The satisfiability problem of LDEL is defined as follows:
Input: a formula ϕ ∈ LDEL;
Output: yes iff there exists a pointed epistemic model (M, w) such that M, w |= ϕ.
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The satisfiability problem is known to be decidable. Indeed, the standard reduction axioms of
DEL [Baltag and Moss, 2004, p. 214] induce a translation tr : LDEL → LEL such that ϕ ∈ LDEL
is satisfiable iff tr(ϕ) ∈ LEL is satisfiable. Since the size of tr(ϕ) is at most exponential in the size
of ϕ [Lutz, 2006] and the satisfiability problem of LEL is PSPACE-complete, the satisfiability
problem of LDEL is in EXPSPACE. This upper bound is nevertheless not optimal: we are going
to prove in this section that the satisfiability problem of LDEL is NEXPTIME-complete.
4.1 Upper bound
In this subsection we present a tableau method that does not rely on reduction axioms and we
prove that it provides a NEXPTIME procedure deciding the satisfiability problem.
4.1.1 Tableau method
Let Lab be a countable set of labels designed to represent worlds of the epistemic model (M, w).
Our tableau method manipulates terms that we call tableau terms and they are of the following
kind:
• (σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ϕ) where σ ∈ Lab is a node (that represents a world in the initial
model) and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, M′j , w
′
j is an event model. This term means that ϕ is
true in the world denoted by σ after the execution of the sequenceM′1, w
′
1, . . . ,M
′
i, w
′
i and
that the sequence is executable in the world denoted by σ;
• (σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i X) means that the sequence M
′
1, w
′
1, . . . ,M
′
i, w
′
i is executable in
the world denoted by σ;
• (σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ⊗) means that the sequence M
′
1, w
′
1, . . . ,M
′
i, w
′
i is not executable
in the world denoted by σ;
• (σRaσ1) means that the world denoted by σ is linked by Ra to the world denoted by σ1;
• ⊥ denotes an inconsistency.
A tableau rule is represented by a numerator N above a line and a finite list of denominators
D1, . . . ,Dk below this line, separated by vertical bars:
N
D1 | . . . | Dk
The numerator and the denominators are finite sets of tableau terms.
A tableau tree is a finite tree with a set of tableau terms at each node. A rule with numerator
N and denominator D is applicable to a node carrying a set Γ if Γ contains an instance of N but
not the instance of its denominator D. If no rule is applicable, Γ is said to be saturated. We call
a node σ an end node if the set of formulas Γ it carries is saturated, or if ⊥ ∈ Γ. The tableau
tree is extended as follows:
1. Choose a leaf node n carrying Γ where n is not an end node, and choose a rule ρ applicable
to n.
2. (a) If ρ has only one denominator, add the appropriate instantiation to Γ.
(b) If ρ has multiple denominators, choose one of them and add to Γ the appropriate
instantiation of this denominator.
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(σ Σ′ ϕ ∧ ψ)
(σ Σ′ ϕ)
(σ Σ′ ψ)
(∧) (σ Σ′ ¬¬ϕ)
(σ Σ′ ϕ)
(¬¬)
(σ Σ′ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ))
(σ Σ′ ¬ϕ) | (σ Σ′ ¬ψ)
(¬∧)
(σ Σ′ p)(σ Σ′ ¬p)
⊥
(⊥)
(σ Σ′ p)
(σ ǫ p)
(←p)
(σ Σ′ ¬p)
(σ ǫ ¬p)
(←¬p)
(σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i Baϕ)
(σ Ra σ1)
(σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i X)
(σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i ϕ)
(σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i ⊗)
(Ba)
(σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ¬Baϕ)
(σ Ra σnew)
(σnew M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i X)
(σnew M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i ¬ϕ)
(¬Ba)
(σ Σ′ ¬[M′, w′]ϕ)
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ X)
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ ¬ϕ)
(¬[M′, w′])
(σ Σ′ [M′, w′]ϕ)
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ ⊗) (σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ X)
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ ϕ)
([M′, w′])
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ X)
(σ Σ′ Pre(w′))
(σ Σ′ X)
(X)
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ ⊗)
(σ Σ′ X)
(σ Σ′ ¬Pre(w′))
(σ Σ′ ⊗)
(⊗)
(σ Σ′ ⊗)(σ Σ′ X)
⊥
(clashX,⊗)
(σ ǫ ⊗)
⊥
(ǫ⊗)
(σ Σ′ [π ∪ γ]ϕ)
(σ Σ′ [π]ϕ)
(σ Σ′ [γ]ϕ)
([π ∪ γ])
(σ Σ′ ¬[π ∪ γ]ϕ)
(σ Σ′ ¬[π]ϕ) |
(σ Σ′ ¬[γ]ϕ)
(¬[π ∪ γ])
Figure 4: Tableau rules
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A branch in a tableau tree is a path from the root to an end node. A branch is closed if its
end node contains ⊥, otherwise it is open. A tableau tree is closed if all its branches are closed,
otherwise it is open. The tableau tree for a formula ϕ ∈ LDEL is the tableau tree obtained from
the root {(σ0 ǫ ϕ)} when all leafs are end nodes. We write ⊢ ϕ when the tableau for ¬ϕ is closed.
The tableau rules of our tableau method are represented in Figure 4. In these rules, Σ′ is
a list of pointed event models M′1, w
′
1, . . . ,M
′
i, w
′
i and ǫ is the empty list. The tableau method
contains the classical Boolean rules (∧), (¬¬), (¬∧). The rules (←p) and (←¬p) handle atomic
propositions. The rule (⊥) makes the current execution fail. The rule for (Ba) is applied for all
j ∈ {1, . . . i} and all u′j such that w
′
jR
′
au
′
j . Similarly, the rule for (¬Ba) is applied by choosing
non-deterministically for all j ∈ {1, . . . i} some u′j such that w
′
jR
′
au
′
j and creating a new fresh
label σnew. The rules (X), (⊗), (clashX,⊗) and (ǫ⊗) handle the preconditions. The last two rules
([π ∪ γ]) and (¬[π ∪ γ]) handle the union operator.
Proposition 1 (Soundness). Let ϕ ∈ LDEL. If ⊢ ϕ, then |= ϕ.
Proof. We prove it by contrapositive. Suppose that 2 ϕ, that is, there exists a pointed epistemic
model (M, w) such that M, w |= ¬ϕ. We must prove that every tableau for (σ0 ǫ ¬ϕ) has an
open branch (the proof of termination is in the proof of Theorem 3).
We say that a set Γf of tableau terms is interpretable if there exists a pointed epistemic
model M = (W,R, V ), a partial function ν : Lab → W such that (M, ν) makes all the tableau
terms in Γf true for the following semantics |=T :
(M, ν) |=T (σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ϕ)
iff the sequence (M′1, w
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i, w
′
i) is executable in (M, ν(σ)) and M ⊗ M
′
1 ⊗ . . . ⊗
M′i, (ν(σ), w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= ϕ
(M, ν) |=T (σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i X)
iff the sequence (M′1, w
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i, w
′
i) is executable in (M, ν(σ))
(M, ν) |=T (σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ⊗)
iff the sequence (M′1, w
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i, w
′
i) is not executable in (M, ν(σ))
(M, ν) |=T (σ Ra σ1) iff ν(σ) Ra ν(σ1)
(M, ν) |=T ⊥ iff false
Since 2 ϕ, the set Γ = {(σ0 ¬ϕ)} is interpretable. Moreover, if a set of formulas is
interpretable, it does not contain ⊥. So, if we prove that when the numerator of a rule is
interpretable, one of the denominators also is, then we have that every tableau for (σ0 ǫ ¬ϕ)
has an open branch. In that case, we say that the rule is sound. We only prove it for (¬Ba),
(Ba), the proof for the other rules being similar. In the following, when ν is a function, we let
ν(x 7→ a) be the function that maps x to a and y to ν(y) if y 6= x.
• Rule (¬Ba): If (M, ν) |=T (σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ¬Baψ), then M ⊗ M
′
1 ⊗ . . . ⊗
M′i, (ν(σ), w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= ¬Baψ. So, there exists (u, u
′
1, . . . , u
′
i) ∈ Ra(ν(σ), w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) such that
M⊗M′1⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i, (u, u
′
1, . . . , u
′
i) |= ¬ψ. So, u ∈ Ra(ν(σ)), the sequence (M
′
1, u
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i, u
′
i)
is executable in (M, w) and M⊗M′1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i, (u, u
′
1, . . . , u
′
i) |= ¬ψ. Let σnew be a new fresh
label and let ν+ := ν(σnew 7→ u). Then, we have that (M, ν
+) |=T (σRaσnew), (M, ν
+) |=T
(σnewM
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i X) and (M, ν
+) |=T (σnew M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i X¬ψ). So, the rule
(¬B) is sound.
• Rule (Ba): If (M, ν) |=T (σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i Baϕ) and (M, ν) |=T (σ Ra σ1), then
M⊗M′1 ⊗ . . . ⊗M
′
i, (ν(σ), w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= Baϕ and ν(σ)Raν(σ1). Let u
′
1 ∈ Ra(w
′
1), . . . , u
′
i ∈
Ra(w
′
i). Either the sequence (M1, u
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i, u
′
i) is executable in (M, ν(σ1)) or it is not. In
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the second case, (M, ν) |=T (σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ⊗) by definition of |=T and the denominator
is interpretable. If the sequence is executable, then (M, ν) |=T (σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i X) by
definition of |=T . Moreover, M⊗M
′
1 ⊗ . . . ⊗M
′
i, (ν(σ1), u
′
1, . . . , u
′
i) |= ϕ, that is, (M, ν) |=T
(σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i ϕ). So, in the first case, the denominator is also interpretable. Hence,
the rule (Ba) is sound.
Proposition 2 (Completeness). Let ϕ ∈ LDEL. If |= ϕ, then ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. We prove it by contrapositive. Suppose that there is a tableau for ϕ that has an open
branch. We prove that there is a pointed epistemic model (M, w) such that M, w |= ϕ. Let Γf
be the set of tableau terms carried by the end node of the open branch. We define the pointed
epistemic model (M, w) = (W,R, V,w) as follows:
• W = {wσ | σ ∈ Lab appears in a tableau term of Γf};
• Ra = {(wσ, wτ ) ∈W ×W | (σRaτ) ∈ Γf} for all a ∈ AGT;
• V (p) = {wσ ∈W | (σ ǫ p) ∈ Γf} for all p ∈ ATM ;
• w = wσ0 .
For all n ∈ N, let P(n) be the induction hypothesis defined as follows: P(n)=“let ϕ ∈ LDEL
and let (M′1, w
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i, w
′
i) be i pointed event models such that
i∑
k=1
|M′k| + |ϕ| = n. If
(σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ϕ) ∈ Γf and (σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i X) ∈ Γf , then the sequence
(M′1, w
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i, w
′
i) is executable in (M, wσ) andM⊗M
′
1⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= ϕ”.
n = 1. In that case, we necessarily have that ϕ = p for some p ∈ ATM and i = 0. So,
(σ ǫ p) ∈ Γf , and therefore M, wσ |= p by definition of M.
n + 1. If i 6= 0, then by saturation of rule (X), we have that (σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i−1, w
′
i−1
Pre(w′i)) ∈ Γf because
i−1∑
k=1
|M′k| + |Pre(w
′
i)| <
i∑
k=1
|M′k| + |ϕ|, we also have that the
sequence (M′1, w
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i−1, w
′
i−1) is executable in (M, wσ) and M ⊗ M
′
1 ⊗ . . . ⊗
M′i−1, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i−1) |= Pre(w
′
i). Therefore, (M
′
1, w
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i, w
′
i) is executable in
(M, wσ). So, we have proved the first part of the induction step. Now, we prove the second
part, namely that M⊗M′1 ⊗ . . . ⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= ϕ. We only prove it for i 6= 0, the
case i = 0 being similar. We reason by cases depending on the structure of ϕ. Note that we
do not introduce another sub-reasoning by induction, we only reason by distinguishing sub-cases.
• If ϕ = p, then (σ ǫ p) ∈ Γf by saturation of (←p). So, M, wσ |= p by definition of M.
Hence, by definition of the product update, M⊗M′1 ⊗ . . . ⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= p. The
case ϕ = ¬p is dealt with similarly. As for the case ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, by saturation of rule (∧), Γf
also contains the tableau term (σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ϕ1) and (σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ϕ2).
Moreover, by saturation of rule (X), Γf also contains (σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i X). So, by
Induction Hypothesis, we have that M ⊗ M′1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= ϕ1 and also
M⊗M′1 ⊗ . . . ⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= ϕ2. So, M⊗M
′
1 ⊗ . . . ⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= ϕ.
The case ϕ = ¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) and ϕ = ¬¬ψ are proved similarly.
• If ϕ = ¬Baψ, then by saturation of rule (¬Ba), we have the existence of σnew
such that (σRaσnew) ∈ Γf and the existence of u
′
1 ∈ R
′
a(w
′
1), . . . , u
′
i ∈ R
′
a(w
′
i) such that
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(σnew M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i X) ∈ Γf and (σnew M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i ¬ψ) ∈ Γf . Now,
i∑
k=1
|M′k| + |¬ψ| <
i∑
k=1
|M′k| + |ϕ|. So, by Induction Hypothesis, (M
′
1, u
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i, u
′
i)
is executable in (M, wσ) and M ⊗ M
′
1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ M
′
i, (wσ, u
′
1, . . . u
′
i) |= ¬ψ. That is,
M⊗M′1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= ¬Baψ.
• If ϕ = Baψ, then let us consider some wσ1 ∈ Ra(wσ), u
′
1 ∈ R
′
a(w
′
1), . . . , u
′
i ∈ R
′
a(w
′
i)
such that (wσ1 , u
′
1, . . . , u
′
i) ∈ M ⊗ M
′
1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ M
′
i. We are going to show that
M⊗M′1⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i, (wσ1 u
′
1, . . . , u
′
i) |= ψ. By definition ofM, (σRaσ1) ∈ Γf . So, by saturation
of rule (Ba), either (σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i ⊗) ∈ Γf or ((σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i X) ∈ Γf and
(σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i ψ) ∈ Γf ). In the first case, by saturation of rule (⊗), either there is k < i
such that ((σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i ¬Pre(w
′
k+1)) ∈ Γf and (σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i X) ∈ Γf )
or (σ1 ǫ ⊗) ∈ Γf . The case (σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i ¬Pre(w
′
k+1)) ∈ Γf and
(σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i X) ∈ Γf ) would entail by Induction Hypothesis that the sequence
(M′1, u
′
1) . . . , (M
′
k, u
′
k) is executable in (M, wσ1), but M⊗M
′
1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
′
k, (wσ1 , u
′
1, . . . , u
′
k) |=
¬Pre(w′k+1). Therefore, this would entail that (wσ1 , u
′
1, . . . , u
′
k) /∈ M ⊗ M
′
1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ M
′
i,
which is also impossible. So, in both cases, we reach a contradiction. Hence,
(σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i ⊗ /∈ Γf and therefore (σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i X) ∈ Γf and
(σ1 M
′
1, u
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, u
′
i ψ) ∈ Γf . Finally, because
i∑
k=1
|M′k| + |ψ| <
i∑
k=1
|M′k| + |ϕ|, we have
by Induction Hypothesis that M⊗M′1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i, (wσ1 , u
′
1, . . . , u
′
i) |= ψ. We have proved this
induction step.
• If ϕ = [M′, w′]ψ, then by saturation of rule ([M′, w′]), we have either
(σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i;M
′, w′ ⊗) ∈ Γf or ((σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ψ) ∈ Γf . In the first case,
by saturation of the rule (⊗), either it holds that (σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ⊗) ∈ Γf or it holds that
((σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i X) ∈ Γf and (σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ¬Pre(w
′)) ∈ Γf ). The sub-case
(σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ⊗) ∈ Γf is impossible because by saturation of rule (clashX,⊗) and be-
cause (σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i X) ∈ Γf , the branch carrying Γf would be closed. Therefore, the
subcase where (σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i X) ∈ Γf and (σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ¬Pre(w
′)) ∈ Γf
holds. Now, because
i∑
k=1
|M′k| + |¬Pre(w
′)| <
i∑
k=1
|M′k| + |ϕ|, by induction hypoth-
esis, we have that the sequence (M′1, w
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i, w
′
i) is executable in (M, wσ) and
M⊗M′1⊗. . .⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= ¬Pre(w
′). Hence,M⊗M′1⊗. . .⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |=
[M′, w′]ψ. In the second case, we have (σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ψ) ∈ Γf . Then, by satu-
ration of rule (¬¬), we also have that (σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i;M
′, w′ ψ) ∈ Γf . Now,
i∑
k=1
|M′k|+ |M
′|+ |ψ| <
i∑
k=1
|M′k|+ |ϕ| =
i∑
k=1
|M′k|+ |M
′|+ |ψ|+1. So, by Induction Hypothesis,
we have that the sequence (M′1, w
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i, w
′
i), (M
′, w′) is executable in (M, wσ) and
M⊗M′1⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i⊗M
′, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i, w
′) |= ψ. So,M⊗M′1⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |=
[M′, w′]ψ. Hence, in both cases, we have that the sequence (M′1, w
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i , w
′
i) is executable
in (M, wσ) and M⊗M
′
1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= [M
′, w′]ψ.
• If ϕ = ¬[M′, w′]ψ, then one can prove this induction step similarly to the second case of
the previous induction step (ϕ = [M′, w′]ψ).
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• If ϕ = [π∪γ]ψ, then by saturation of ([π∪γ]), we have that (σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i [π]ψ) ∈
Γf and also (σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i [γ]ψ) ∈ Γf . Then, by Induction Hypothesis, the sequence
(M′1, w
′
1), . . . (M
′
i, w
′
i) is executable in (M, wσ),M⊗M
′
1⊗. . .⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= [π]ψ and
M⊗M′1⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= [γ]ψ. Therefore,M⊗M
′
1⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |=
[π ∪ γ]ψ.
• If ϕ = ¬[π ∪ γ]ψ, then, by saturation of rule (¬[π ∪ γ]), either it holds that
(σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ¬[π]ψ) ∈ Γf or it holds that (σ M
′
1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ¬[γ]ψ) ∈ Γf .
Without loss of generality, we can assume that (σ M′1, w
′
1; . . . ;M
′
i, w
′
i ¬[π]ψ) ∈ Γf . Then,
by Induction Hypothesis, the sequence (M′1, w
′
1), . . . , (M
′
i, w
′
i) is executable in (M, wσ) and
M⊗M′1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |= ¬[π]ψ. Hence, M⊗M
′
1 ⊗ . . .⊗M
′
i, (wσ, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
i) |=
¬[π ∪ γ]ψ.
Example 4. We prove with our tableau method that the formula ϕ =
¬[M′1, w
′
1][M
′
2, w
′
2]B2B1B2p from Example 3 is satisfiable, where M
′
1, w
′
1 and M
′
2, w
′
2 are
defined in Example 2. In Figure 5, an open branch of the tableau tree for ϕ is represented. The
set Σ22 is saturated: no more tableau rule is applicable. From this branch, we may extract a
pointed epistemic model (M, σ0) such that M, σ0 |= ϕ.
4.1.2 NEXPTIME-membership
Theorem 3. The satisfiability problem of LDEL is in NEXPTIME.
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ LDEL and let T be the tableau tree for ϕ. The tableau method is a
non-deterministic procedure. Indeed, rules (¬∧), (Ba), (⊗), (¬[π ∪ γ]) are non-deterministic
rules. Each node of the tree T is the saturation of all rules concerning a specific symbol σ:
(∧), (¬¬), (¬∧), (⊥), (←p), (←¬p), (¬[M
′, w′]), ([M′, w′]), (X), (⊗), ([π ∪ γ]), (¬[π ∪ γ]). There is
an edge from a node corresponding to σ to a node corresponding to σ′ if (σ Raσ
′) is in the set
of terms in the current execution. In other terms, an edge corresponds to an application of the
rule (¬Ba). Rule (Ba) is a propagation rule: from terms concerning σ, it adds terms concerning
σ′ where (σ Raσ
′). In this proof, we show that:
1. at each node of T concerning a specific symbol σ, there are at most an exponential number
of terms;
2. the arity of T is at most exponential;
3. the depth of T is linear.
Each step of the algorithm is an application of a rule and it will add new terms. So, the
construction of the tree T is done non-deterministically in exponential time.
Proof of 1 Except terms of the form (σ Ra σ
′), all other terms are of the form (σ Σ′ ψ)
where:
• ψ is a formula in a closure CL(ϕ) of the initial formula ϕ (this includes the fact that ψ can
be in the closure of a precondition appearing in an event model of ϕ);
• Σ′ is a list of pointed event models M′1, w
′
1, . . . ,M
′
i, w
′
i.
Formally, the closure CL(ϕ) of a formula ϕ is the smallest set of formulas containing ϕ and
satisfying all those constraints:
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• if ¬ψ ∈ CL(ϕ), then ψ ∈ CL(ϕ);
• if χ ∧ ψ ∈ CL(ϕ), then χ, ψ,¬χ,¬ψ ∈ CL(ϕ);
• if Baψ ∈ CL(ϕ), then ¬ψ, ψ ∈ CL(ϕ);
• if [M′, w′]ψ ∈ CL(ϕ), then ψ,¬ψ ∈ CL(ϕ) and all the precondition formulas are in CL(ϕ),
that is, if M′ = (W ′, R′, P re), then for all w′ ∈W ′, Pre(w′) ∈ CL(ϕ);
• if [π ∪ γ]ψ ∈ CL(ϕ) then [π]ψ, [γ]ψ ∈ CL(ϕ).
The cardinality of the closure CL(ϕ) is linear in |ϕ|.
Now let us give an upper bound for the cardinality of the set of possible lists Σ′ of pointed
event models. Such a list is of the following form M′1, u
′
1, . . . ,M
′
n, u
′
n, where:
• n is bounded by the size of ϕ;
• M′i are event models that appear in the formula ϕ;
• each u′i are possible events of M
′
i.
Let us assume that n is chosen. The number of event models appearing in ϕ is bounded by |ϕ|, so
there are at most |ϕ| choices forM′1. The number of possible choices for u
′
1 is bounded by |M
′
1| ≤
|ϕ|. So there are at most |ϕ| choices for u′1. Hence, there are at most |ϕ|
2 choices forM′1, u
′
1. We
can repeat the same reasoning for counting the number of choices for M′2, u
′
2, . . . ,M
′
n−1, u
′
n−1
and M′n, u
′
n. By multiplying all the number of choices, we see that there are at most (|ϕ|
2)n =
O(|ϕ|2|ϕ|) possible lists Σ′ for a given n. Since there are at most |ϕ| choices for n, there are at
most |ϕ| × O
(
|ϕ|2|ϕ|
)
= O
(
|ϕ|2|ϕ|+1
)
= O
(
2|ϕ|
2
)
possible lists Σ′. So, the number of possible
sequences Σ′ is exponential in the size of ϕ.
Combining these two intermediary results, we obtain that the set of all possible terms in a
given node of T is in O (|ϕ|)×O
(
2|ϕ|
2
)
= O
(
2|ϕ|
2
)
, so at most exponential in the size of ϕ.
Proof of 2 The worse case is when there is an exponential number of terms of the form
(σ Σ′ ¬Baψ). Indeed, in that case, an exponential number of new symbols σnew will arise from
the applications of rule (¬Ba) on terms concerning σ. In other words, the arity of T is at most
exponential in the size of ϕ.
Proof of 3 First, we warn the reader about the following fact: it is false that the modal
depth of the subformulas decreases strictly from a node to its children, because of the rules (X)
and (⊗). The idea is that once all modal operators of the form Baψ and [M
′, w′]ψ have been
treated, the rules (X) and (⊗) stop to be applicable for the corresponding formulas.
Let us define a quantity that is strictly decreasing during the execution of the tableau method.
Let us consider a given term (σ Σ′ ψ). The size of a term t = (σ Σ′ ψ) is defined by
|t| = 1 +
∑
(M′,w′)∈Σ′
(|M′|+ 1) + |ψ|
where |X| = | ⊗ | = 1 and (M′, w′) ∈ Σ′ means that the event model (M′, w′) appears in Σ′.
Now, following Fitting’s terminology [Fitting, 1983], all the rules of the tableau method are
strictly analytic: all terms t that are in the denominator of a rule are such that there exists a
term c in the numerator such that |t| < |c|. For instance let us consider the following rule:
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(σ Σ′ [M′, w′]ϕ)
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ ⊗) (σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ X)
(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ ¬ϕ)
([M′, w′])
We have |(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ ⊗)| < A, |(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ X)| < A and |(σ Σ′ ;M′, w′ ¬ϕ)| < A
where A = |(σ Σ′ [M′, w′]ϕ)|.
To each node of the tree T that corresponds to a given symbol σ, we attach the following
quantity: the maximum of |t| where t is a term concerning σ. As rules are strictly analytic, this
quantity will decrease strictly on a branch of the tree. Furthermore, for the root of the tree,
this quantity is |(σ0 ǫ ϕ)| = 1+ |ϕ|. As this quantity is positive, it proves the terminaison of the
procedure and also that the depth of the tree T is linear in the size of ϕ.
To sum up, the depth of the tree T is linear whereas the arity may be exponential. As a conse-
quence, the tree T has at most an exponential number of nodes in the size of ϕ. Indeed, because
of point 1, the number of nodes of the tree T is in O
((
2|ϕ|
2
)|ϕ|)
= O
(
2|ϕ|
3
)
which is expo-
nential in the size of ϕ. Moreover, constructing such a tree T can be done non-deterministically
in an exponential amount of time, for each execution of the tableau method. So, the procedure
is in NEXPTIME.
4.2 Lower bound
We prove that the algorithm based on our tableau method of the previous section is optimal in
terms of computational complexity. To do so, we prove that the satisfiability problem of LDEL
is NEXPTIME-hard by reducing a NEXPTIME-complete tiling problem to it [Boas, 1997].
Let C be a countable and infinite set of colors. A tile type t is a 4-tuple of colors, denoted
t = (left(t), right(t), up(t), down(t)) ∈ C4. We consider the following tiling problem:
Input: a finite set T of tile types, t0 ∈ T and a natural number k written in its binary
form.
Output: yes iff there exists a function τ from {0, . . . k}2 to T satisfying the following
constraints:
τ(0, 0) = t0; (1)
for all x ∈ {0, . . . , k} and y ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}:
up(τ(x, y)) = down(τ(x, y + 1)); (2)
for all x ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} and y ∈ {0, . . . , k}:
right(τ(x, y)) = left(τ(x+ 1, y)). (3)
In other words, the problem is to decide whether we can tile a (k+1)× (k+1) grid with the
tile types of T , t0 being placed onto (0, 0).
Theorem 4. The satisfiability problem of LDEL is NEXPTIME -hard.
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Σ0 := {(σ0 ǫ ϕ)}y (¬[M′,w′])
Σ1 := Σ0 ∪
{
(σ0 M
′
1, w
′
1 X)
(σ0 M
′
1, w
′
1¬[M
′
2, w
′
2]B2B1B2p)
}
y (X)
Σ2 := Σ1 ∪
{
(σ0 ǫ X), (σ0 ǫ p)
}y (¬[M′,w′])
Σ3 := Σ2 ∪
{
(σ0 M
′
1, w
′
1;M
′
2, w
′
2 X)
(σ0 M
′
1, w
′
1;M
′
2, w
′
2 ¬B2B1B2p)
}
y (X)
Σ4 := Σ3 ∪
{
(σ0 M
′
1, w
′
1 X), (σ0 M
′
1, w
′
1 B2p)
}y (¬Ba)
Σ5 := Σ4 ∪


(σ0 R2 σ1)
(σ1 M
′
1, w
′
1;M
′
2, u
′
2 X)
(σ1 M
′
1, w
′
1;M
′
2, u
′
2 ¬B1B2p)

y (Ba)
Σ6 := Σ5 ∪
{
(σ1 M
′
1, w
′
1 X), (σ1 M
′
1, w
′
1 p)
}y (X)
Σ7 := Σ6 ∪
{
(σ1 M
′
1, w
′
1 X), (σ1 M
′
1, w
′
1 ¬(p ∧ ¬p))
}y (¬∧,¬¬)
Σ8 := Σ7 ∪
{
(σ1 M
′
1, w
′
1 p)
}y (→p)
Σ9 := Σ8 ∪
{
(σ1 ǫ p)
}y (¬Ba)
Σ10 := Σ9 ∪


(σ1 R1 σ2)
(σ2 M
′
1, u
′
1;M
′
2, u
′
2 X)
(σ2 M
′
1, u
′
1;M
′
2, u
′
2 ¬B2p)

y (X)
Σ11 := Σ10 ∪
{
(σ2 M
′
1, u
′
1 X), (σ2 M
′
1, u
′
1 ¬(p ∧ ¬p))
}y (¬∧,¬¬)
Σ12 := Σ11 ∪
{
(σ2 M
′
1, u
′
1 p)
}y (→p)
Σ13 := Σ12 ∪
{
(σ2 ǫ p)
}
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y (X)
Σ14 := Σ13 ∪
{
(σ2 ǫ X), (σ2 ǫ ⊤)
}y (¬∧,¬¬)
Σ15 := Σ14 ∪
{
(σ2 ǫ p)
}y (¬Ba)
Σ16 := Σ15 ∪


(σ2 R2 σ3)
(σ3 M
′
1, u
′
1;M
′
2, u
′
2 X)
(σ3 M
′
1, u
′
1;M
′
2, u
′
2 ¬p)

y (→¬p)
Σ17 := Σ16 ∪
{
(σ3 ǫ ¬p)
}y (X)
Σ18 := Σ17 ∪
{
(σ3 M
′
1, u
′
1 X)
(σ3 M
′
1, u
′
1;M
′
2, u
′
2 ¬(p ∧ ¬p))
}
y (X)
Σ19 := Σ18 ∪
{
(σ3 ǫ ¬(p ∧ ¬p)
}y (¬∧,¬¬)
Σ20 := Σ19 ∪
{
(σ3 ǫ ¬p)
}y (¬∧,¬¬)
Σ21 := Σ20 ∪
{
(σ3 M
′
1, u
′
1;M
′
2, u
′
2 ¬p)
}y (→¬p)
Σ22 := Σ21 ∪
{
(σ3 ǫ ¬p)
}
Figure 5: An open branch of the tableau for ϕ
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that k = 2n. Let us consider an instance of the
NEXPTIME-hard tiling problem described above. Our goal is to provide a polynomial translation
from this instance to an instance of the satisfiability problem of LDEL.
The idea is to embed two identical k × k-tilings into a single tree. Each leaf of the tree
represents both a position (x1, y1) in the first tiling and a position (x2, y2) in the second tiling.
We need to encode two identical tilings because, in order to check constraints 2 and 3, we will
need to refer to the tile located to the right or to the left of a given position in a tiling, and
also to refer to the tile located above or below it. This is hardly possible if we encode a single
tiling at the leafs of a tree, because we would need to ‘backtrack’ in the tree to access these other
positions.
We start by showing how to encode two identical tilings at the leafs of a tree. Then we will
show how to express the three constraints 1, 2 and 3 in the definition of a tiling.
1. The coordinates (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) of the two tilings are represented by the valuations
of atomic propositions p0, . . . , p4n−1. More precisely, the set X1 = {p0, . . . , pn−1} contains the
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atomic propositions encoding the binary representation of the integer x1, Y1 = {pn, . . . , p2n−1}
contains the atomic propositions encoding the binary representation of the integer y1, X2 =
{p2n, . . . , p3n−1} contains the atomic propositions encoding the binary representation of the
integer x2, and Y2 = {p3n, . . . , p4n−1} contains the atomic propositions encoding the binary
representation of the integer y2. For instance, for n = 4, the coordinates (x1, y1) = (4, 3) and
(x2, y2) = (11, 2) are represented at a leaf of the tree by the following valuation. We recall that
in binary notation, 4 is represented by 100, 3 is represented by 11, 12 is represented by 1100 and
2 is represented by 10.
¬p0, p1,¬p2,¬p3︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
¬p4,¬p5, p6, p7︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
p8, p9,¬p10,¬p11︸ ︷︷ ︸
12
¬p12,¬p13, p14,¬p15︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
We then encode the existence of all valuations over X1 ∪ Y1 ∪ X2 ∪ Y2 with the following
formula: ∧
l<4n
Bla
(
〈Ba〉pl ∧ 〈Ba〉¬pl ∧
∧
i<l
((pi → Bapi) ∧ (¬pi → Ba¬pi))
)
. (4)
Formula 4 is true at a pointed epistemic model iff this pointed epistemic model is bisimilar up
to modal depth 4n to a binary tree of depth 4n whose leafs contain all the possible valuations
associated to p0, . . . , p4n−1.
In order to check Constraints 2 and 3 in the definition of a tiling, we will need to refer to the
tile located to the right or to the left of a given position in a tiling, and also to refer to the tile
located above or below it. The following formulas encode the fact that any pair of coordinates
(x1, x2) and (y1, y2) of the two tilings satisfy the properties x1 = x2, x1 = x2 + 1, y1 = y2 and
y1 = y2 + 1 respectively:
(x1 = x2) ,
∧
i<n
(pi ↔ pi+2n) (5)
(y1 = y2) ,
∧
n≤i<2n
(pi ↔ pi+2n) (6)
(x1 = x2 + 1) ,
∨
i<n
(∧
j<i
(pj+2n ↔ pj) ∧ ¬pi+2n ∧ pi ∧
∧
i<j<n
(pj+2n ∧ ¬pj)
)
(7)
(y1 = y2 + 1) ,
∨
n≤i<2n
( ∧
n≤j<i
(pj+2n ↔ pj) ∧ ¬pi+2n ∧ pi ∧
∧
i<j<2n
(pj+2n ∧ ¬pj)
)
(8)
The tile types of the first tiling are represented by atomic propositions 1t and the tile types of
the second tiling are represented by atomic propositions 2t′ , where t and t
′ range over T . They
hold at a leaf of the tree whose coordinates correspond to (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) when the tile type
of the first tiling at coordinate (x1, y1) is t and the tile type of the second tiling at coordinate
(x2, y2) is t
′.
Formulas 9 and 10 below encode the fact that, at each leaf of the tree, there is exactly one tile
type for the first tiling and exactly one tile type for the second tiling. Formula 11 below encodes
the fact that when these two pairs of coordinates coincide, that is when x1 = x2 and y1 = y2,
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then the tile type of the first tiling and the tile type of the second tiling are identical.
B4na
(∨
t∈T
1t ∧
∨
t∈T
2t
)
(9)
B4na
∧
{(1t → ¬1t′) ∧ (2t → ¬2t′) | t, t
′ ∈ T, t 6= t′} (10)
B4na
(
(x1 = x2) ∧ (y1 = y2)→
∧
t∈T
(1t ↔ 2t)
)
(11)
However, it may be the case that in the tree, two different leafs with the same valuation have
different tile types. Therefore, we also have to constrain the tree so that the leafs denoting the
same position in the first tiling (resp. second tiling) contain the same tile type for the first tiling
(resp. second tiling). This is expressed by the following two formulas:
[M′p0 ∪M
′
¬p0 ] . . . [M
′
p2n−1
∪M′¬p2n−1 ]
∨
t∈T
B4na 1t (12)
[M′p2n ∪M
′
¬p2n ] . . . [M
′
p4n−1
∪M′¬p4n−1 ]
∨
t∈T
B4na 2t (13)
where for a given a literal ℓ (p or ¬p), the pointed event model M′ℓ = (W
′, R′, P re, w′0) is
defined as follows: W ′ = {w′i | i ∈ {0, . . . , 4n}}; R
′
a = {(w
′
i, w
′
i+1) | i ∈ {0, . . . , 4n− 1}}; and
Pre(w′i) = ⊤ for all i < 4n and Pre(w
′
4n) = ℓ.
In formula 12, the sequence of pointed event models [M′p0 ∪M
′
¬p0 ] . . . [M
′
p2n−1
∪M′¬p2n−1 ]
non-deterministically picks a valuation v over X1 ∪Y1 and selects the branches of the tree whose
leafs satisfy this valuation. Then, the formula
∨
t∈T B
4n
a 1t checks that these leafs, which denote
the same position in the first tiling, are of the same tile type t. Likewise with formula 13 for the
second tiling.
So, with formulas 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, we have encoded in the tree two identical tilings in a
single tree. Importantly, note that the tree is defined so that each leaf refers to two coordinates
of the tiling, which can possibly be identical or consecutive. It is this feature which will allow
us to express that constraints 2 and 3 of the definition of a tiling hold.
2. Constraints 1, 2 and 3 of the definition of a tiling are expressed respectively by the following
formulas:
B4na
(( ∧
i<4n
¬pi
)
→ t0
)
(14)
B4na
(
(x1 = x2) ∧ (y1 = y2 + 1)→
∧
t∈T
{
1t →
∨
{2t′ | t
′ ∈ T, down(t′) = up(t)}
})
(15)
B4na
(
(x1 = x2 + 1) ∧ (y1 = y2)→
∧
t∈T
{
1t →
∨
{2t′ | t
′ ∈ T, left(t′) = right(t)}
})
(16)
As we said at the beginning of the proof, these two constraints motivate the need to encode two
tilings: for a given position in a tiling, we need to refer to the tile located to the right or to the
left of it, and to refer to the tile located above or below it. This would not be possible with our
epistemic language if the tiling was encoded by a single tree.
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One can then check that there exists a tiling for the instance of the tiling problem iff the
formula ϕ, which is the conjunction of fomulas 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 is satisfiable
in LDEL.
3. Finally, we show that the reduction is polynomial in the size of the instance of the tiling
problem. The formula of Equation 4 is of size O(n2). The formulas of Equations 12, 13 are of
size O(n2 + |T | × n). The other formulas are clearly of size polynomial in the size of the input,
so the result follows. Importantly, note that if we decided to rewrite the formulas 12 and 13
without using the union operator ∪, then the corresponding formula would be exponential in the
size of the input. So, the use of the union operator is really crucial in order to have a polynomial
reduction from the tiling problem to our satisfiability problem.
5 Related work
5.1 Theory
There exists a terminating tableau method solving the satisfiability problem of LDEL
[Hansen, 2010]. This method writes subformulas by applying the reduction axioms
[Baltag and Moss, 2004, p. 214]. It is therefore mainly a variant of the tableau method of classi-
cal multi-modal logic Kn. Even if we know that tr blows up exponentially the size of the input
formula, the computational complexity of this tableau method is not studied. In this section, we
review the existing results about computational complexity of DEL.
5.1.1 Public Announcement Logic (PAL)
Public Announcement Logic (PAL) [Plaza, 1989] is an extension of epistemic logic with a dynamic
operator [ψ!]ϕ whose truth conditions are defined as follows:
M, w |= [ψ!]ϕ iff M, w |= ψ implies Mψ, w |= ϕ
where Mψ is the restriction of M to the worlds which satisfy ψ. PAL is a fragment of DEL: the
language of PAL is LDEL restricted to event models consisting of a single possible event with
reflexive arrows for all agents. There is a gap between PAL and DEL in terms of computational
complexity, both for the model checking problem and the satisfiability problem. Indeed, the
model checking of PAL is in P (also with common belief) [van Benthem and Kooi, 2004] and
the satisfiability problem for PAL is PSPACE-complete [Lutz, 2006]. Despite the fact that there
exist reduction axioms for PAL, it is difficult to implement a direct translation using reduction
axioms. In fact, there are properties that can be expressed exponentially more succinctly in PAL
than in epistemic logic [French et al., 2011]. Note that there exist PSPACE tableau methods for
solving the satisfiability problem in PAL [de Boer, 2007, Balbiani et al., 2010].
5.1.2 DEL-sequents
DEL-sequents [Aucher, 2011] are triples of the form ϕ,ϕ′ |= ϕ′′ where ϕ,ϕ′′ ∈ LEL and ϕ
′
is a formula of a language for event models. A DEL-sequent ϕ,ϕ′ |= ϕ′′ holds when for all
pointed epistemic model (M, w) such that M, w |= ϕ, for all pointed event model (M′, w′)
such that M′, w′ |= ϕ′, if (M′, w′) is executable in (M, w), then M⊗M′, (w,w′) |= ϕ′′. The
problem of determining whether a DEL-sequent holds is NEXPTIME-complete and there ex-
ists a tableau method for it. DEL-sequents have been generalized to sequences of the form
ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn i
1
ψ and ϕ0, ϕ
′
1, ϕ1, [4] . . . , ϕ
′
n, ϕn i
2
ψ′. The corresponding satisfiability
problem is also NEXPTIME-complete [Aucher et al., 2012].
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5.1.3 The sequence and ‘star’ iteration operators
The sequence and ‘star’ iteration operators are constructions enabling to build complex programs
as in Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL [Harel et al., 2000]). The truth conditions are defined
as follows:
M, w |= [π; γ]ϕ iff M, w |= [π][γ]ϕ
M, w |= [π∗]ϕ iff there is a finite sequence π; . . . ;π such that M, w |= [π; . . . ;π]ϕ
We do not know about the computational complexity of the model-checking problem when
the operator [π∗]ϕ is added to the language. In fact, we do not even know whether it is decidable.
The computational complexity of the satisfiability problem remains the same when the sequen-
tial composition operator is added. However, adding a ‘star’ operator makes the satisfiability
problem undecidable. This result is not really surprising, it is a direct corollary of the result
of [Miller and Moss, 2005] stating that Public Announcement Logic with the ‘star’ operator is
already undecidable.
5.1.4 The common belief operator
We may extend the language with the common belief operator CGϕ, where G ⊆ AGT. The truth
conditions are defined as follows:
M, w |= CGϕ iff for all v ∈
( ⋃
a∈G
Ra
)+
(w),M, v |= ϕ
Intuitively, CGϕ is an abbreviation of an infinite conjunction [Fagin et al., 1995]: CGϕ =
E1Gϕ ∧ E
2
Gϕ ∧ E
3
Gϕ ∧ . . ., where E
k
Gϕ is defined inductively as follows: E
1
Gϕ =
∧
a∈G
Baϕ and
Ek+1G ϕ = E
1
GE
k
Gϕ.
We do not know about the computational complexity of the satisfiability problem when the
common belief operator is added to the language LDEL. However, we know that it is decid-
able and that the language with common belief operator is more expressive than the epistemic
language LEL with common belief [Baltag et al., 1998, Baltag et al., 1999].
5.2 Implementation
There exist two implementations of our decision problems:
1. The model-checker DEMO [van Eijck, 2007], standing for Dynamic Epistemic MOdel-
ing tool, can evaluate formulas of LDEL in epistemic models, display graphically epistemic
models, event models and updates of epistemic models by event models, translate formu-
las of LDEL to formulas of PDL. DEMO is written in Haskel and has been applied in
[van Ditmarsch et al., 2005] and [van Ditmarsch et al., 2006]. Also, it has been used to inves-
tigate the pros and cons of modeling some well-known problems of computer security within the
DEL framework [van Eijck and Orzan, 2007].
2. The program Aximo [Richards and Sadrzadeh, 2009], written in C++, implements an al-
gorithm for proving properties of interactive multi-agent scenarios encoded in epistemic systems.
Epistemic systems provide an algebraic semantics to DEL and were developed together with a
sound and complete sequent calculus [Baltag et al., 2007].
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6 Concluding remarks
Our work contributes to the proof theory and the study of the computational complexity of DEL,
which has been rather neglected so far. Although our results show that our decision problems
are not tractable, it turns out that the DEMO implementation does not fare worse and often
even better in terms of time of execution than other model-checkers modeling the same problems,
without resorting to the DEL methodology [van Ditmarsch et al., 2006].
We still need to investigate whether or not the computational complexity remains the same
when we consider other epistemic logics as the basis of DEL, such as S5. Moreover, our results
rely on the fact that we use the union operator in the language, an open problem is to obtain
similar results without this operator. Finally, we plan to implement our tableau method in
LotrecScheme [Schwarzentruber, 2011].
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discussions.
References
[Aucher, 2011] Aucher, G. (2011). DEL-sequents for progression. Journal of Applied Non-
Classical Logics, 21(3-4):289–321.
[Aucher et al., 2012] Aucher, G., Maubert, B., and Schwarzentruber, F. (2012). Generalized
DEL-sequents. In del Cerro, L. F., Herzig, A., and Mengin, J., editors, JELIA, volume 7519
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 54–66. Springer.
[Balbiani et al., 2010] Balbiani, P., van Ditmarsch, H., Herzig, A., and de Lima, T. (2010).
Tableaux for public announcement logic. Journal of Logic and Computation, 20(1):55–76.
[Baltag et al., 2007] Baltag, A., Coecke, B., and Sadrzadeh, M. (2007). Epistemic actions as
resources. Journal of Logic and Computation, 17(3):555–585.
[Baltag and Moss, 2004] Baltag, A. and Moss, L. (2004). Logic for epistemic programs. Synthese,
139(2):165–224.
[Baltag et al., 1998] Baltag, A., Moss, L., and Solecki, S. (1998). The logic of common knowledge,
public announcement, and private suspicions. In Gilboa, I., editor, Proceedings of TARK98,
pages 43–56.
[Baltag et al., 1999] Baltag, A., Moss, L., and Solecki, S. (1999). The logic of public announce-
ments, common knowledge and private suspicions. Technical report, Indiana University.
[Boas, 1997] Boas, P. (1997). The convenience of tilings. In Complexity, Logic, and Recursion
Theory, pages 331–363. Marcel Dekker Inc.
[de Boer, 2007] de Boer, M. (2007). KE tableaux for public anouncement logic. In Proceedings
of FAMAS 07, Durham UK.
[Fagin et al., 1995] Fagin, R., Halpern, J., Moses, Y., and Vardi, M. (1995). Reasoning about
knowledge. MIT Press.
[Fitting, 1983] Fitting, M. (1983). Proof methods for modal and intuitionistic logics. D. Reidel,
Dordrecht.
RR n° 8164
On the Complexity of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (Extended Version) 27
[French et al., 2011] French, T., van der Hoek, W., Iliev, P., and Kooi, B. P. (2011). Succinctness
of epistemic languages. In Walsh, T., editor, IJCAI, pages 881–886. IJCAI/AAAI.
[Hansen, 2010] Hansen, J. (2010). Terminating tableaux for dynamic epistemic logics. Electronic
Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 262:141–156.
[Harel et al., 2000] Harel, D., Kozen, D., and Tiuryn, J. (2000). Dynamic Logic. MIT Press.
[Lutz, 2006] Lutz, C. (2006). Complexity and succinctness of public announcement logic. In
Proceedings of AAMAS 2006, pages 137–143. ACM.
[Miller and Moss, 2005] Miller, J. and Moss, L. (2005). The undecidability of iterated modal
relativization. Studia Logica, 79(3):373–407.
[Papadimitriou, 1995] Papadimitriou, C. H. (1995). Computational complexity. Addison Wesley.
[Plaza, 1989] Plaza, J. (1989). Logics of public communications. In Emrich, M. L., Pfeifer, M. Z.,
Hadzikadic, M., and Ras, Z. W., editors, Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on
Methodologies for Intelligent Systems, pages 201–216.
[Richards and Sadrzadeh, 2009] Richards, S. and Sadrzadeh, M. (2009). Aximo: Automated
axiomatic reasoning for information update. Electr. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci., 231:211–225.
[Schwarzentruber, 2011] Schwarzentruber, F. (2011). Lotrecscheme. Electr. Notes Theor. Com-
put. Sci., 278:187–199.
[van Benthem and Kooi, 2004] van Benthem, J. and Kooi, B. (2004). Reduction axioms for
epistemic actions. In Schmidt, R., Pratt-Hartmann, I., Reynolds, M., and Wansing, H., editors,
AiML-2004: Advances in Modal Logic, number UMCS-04-9-1 in Technical Report Series, pages
197–211, University of Manchester.
[van Ditmarsch et al., 2007] van Ditmarsch, H., van der Hoek, W., and Kooi, B. (2007). Dynamic
Epistemic Logic, volume 337 of Synthese library. Springer.
[van Ditmarsch et al., 2005] van Ditmarsch, H. P., Ruan, J., and Verbrugge, L. C. (2005). Model
checking sum and product. In Zhang, S. and Jarvis, R., editors, Australian Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, volume 3809 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 790–795.
Springer.
[van Ditmarsch et al., 2006] van Ditmarsch, H. P., van der Hoek, W., van der Meyden, R., and
Ruan, J. (2006). Model checking russian cards. Electr. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci., 149(2):105–
123.
[van Eijck, 2007] van Eijck, J. (2007). Demo — a demo of epistemic modelling. In van Benthem,
J., Gabbay, D., and Löwe, B., editors, Interactive Logic — Proceedings of the 7th Augustus de
Morgan Workshop, Texts in Logic and Games 1, pages 305–363.
[van Eijck and Orzan, 2007] van Eijck, J. and Orzan, S. (2007). Epistemic verification of
anonymity. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 168(0):159 – 174.
RR n° 8164
RESEARCH CENTRE
RENNES – BRETAGNE ATLANTIQUE
Campus universitaire de Beaulieu
35042 Rennes Cedex
Publisher
Inria
Domaine de Voluceau - Rocquencourt
BP 105 - 78153 Le Chesnay Cedex
inria.fr
ISSN 0249-6399
